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A proposal for judging the 
trustworthiness of research 
findings 
 
Stephen Gorard 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper offers a procedure for, and a description of the elements 
involved in judging how trustworthy a research finding is. The idea is 
of value to the users of research evidence and to researchers 
themselves when creating a synthesis of existing evidence (i.e. in a 
literature review. The focus here is on active designs to address causal 
research questions, but the ideas can easily be extended to other types 
of research. Other than design, the elements suggested are sample 
size and quality, data quality, fidelity of intervention, and threats to 
validity. These are combined in a kind of ‘sieve’ to produce a 
judgement-based star-rating for the believability of a piece of research. 
Trustworthiness of research findings is currently an area with too little 
focus for the development of new researchers. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
If social science research is to have useful and warranted impact, for 
example in public policy, the prospective research user really needs to 
know three things. These are: 
 
 the ‘effect’ size or strength of any pattern or finding that is 
being reported,  
 the costs, benefits and possible dangers of using that 
finding in practice,  
 and how trustworthy the findings are. 
 
This assumes, of course, that the findings are truly reported and that 
the research has integrity. If the research is fabricated, distorted or 
exaggerated, for example, then none of the other three things matter. 
The focus of ethics committees ought to be much more on keeping 
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research honest than it currently is. The effect size or summary of the 
finding is a relatively straightforward technical issue dealt with well in 
many methods resources. Cost:benefit analyses are generally well-
covered by economists. However, the trustworthiness of findings is 
less well-developed as a theme for researchers. 
 
The same issue of trustworthiness arises when researchers are 
considering each other’s work. A synthesis of existing evidence must 
take more than the effect size into account, otherwise weak evidence 
will be bundled along with strong evidence, leading to invalid and 
possibly dangerously misleading conclusions. ‘Strong’ and ‘weak’ here 
refer not to size of the difference, pattern or trend uncovered but to 
how convincing the evidence for it is. Meta-analyses, systematic and 
narrative reviews of existing evidence will be invalid if each study is 
merely given equal weight. But they will also be invalid if only some 
studies are included while others are rejected as not reaching some 
threshold of trustworthiness. ‘Trustworthiness’ here is something like 
how convincing the finding is, or even how much one would be 
prepared to bet on it being true or replicable. How can researchers 
portray the trustworthiness of their results, or judge those of others? 
This is the question addressed by this paper. 
 
Both reasons for needing an assessment of research trustworthiness 
currently face similar problems. Policy-makers, practitioners, advisers, 
think tanks and other research users generally do not understand 
enough about the reported research base in their area to make the 
kinds of judgement necessary. And the main reason for this is that 
researchers do not present their findings and the evidence for them in 
a form that others can readily understand. Researchers do the same to 
each other, presenting results with undigested output from statistical 
software, long paragraphs and sentences, and needless verbiage and 
neologisms (Gorard, 2013). Partly because of this some researchers 
think that they are providing a comprehensible estimate of 
trustworthiness when they are not.  
 
A clear example is the reporting of ‘confidence’ intervals. Confidence 
intervals around a research finding are widely misunderstood and 
misinterpreted by the researchers themselves, meaning that there is 
little chance that research users will understand them but a good 
chance they will be misled (Gorard 2014). Confidence intervals are 
therefore dangerous (Matthews 1998). They are not an estimate of how 
much ‘confidence’ to have in the result; nor do they offer a likelihood 
that the ‘true’ result will lie within that interval. Their true definition is 
an ideal, and it is recursive (involving itself) and reversed in logic 
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(modus tollens). Confidence intervals are frequently misapplied to 
situations not involving true and complete random samples. They take 
no account of design bias, missing data, measurement error or any of 
the myriad things that really matter when judging the trustworthiness 
of a research finding. But they are erroneously presented by many 
writers as if they could do these magical things. What is offered in this 
paper is not to be used ‘instead’ of misguided approaches like 
confidence intervals because confidence intervals do not address the 
same issues at all. Confidence intervals should not be used to judge 
the trustworthiness of findings.  
 
The elements of trustworthiness 
 
It must be assumed for the purposes of this paper that any study 
being considered in terms of trustworthiness has been fully and 
clearly explained. If the elements discussed below, such as sample size 
or respondent dropout, are not clear then the reader is justified in 
assuming the worst. Put simply, a poorly described study cannot be 
trusted. Once the design and methods used in a study are clear, then 
it is possible to begin judging how believable the findings ought to be. 
The proposal in this paper is that a number of related issues need to 
be considered, stemming from the design of the study and its 
subsequent conduct. The design needs to fit the research question(s) 
being addressed (White 2009). The discussion that follows is based 
around causal questions, since the designs for these are the most 
complex, and therefore the hardest for other researchers to assess. 
 
Design 
Although a valid causal model may start with an association, and may 
include an explanatory model and a proposed sequence of events, it is 
fundamentally based on a comparison between two or more groups of 
cases (Gorard et al., 2011). One (or more groups) is exposed to one 
level of the purported cause, and another is exposed to a clearly 
different level of the cause. All other things being equal, a difference in 
the effect between the two groups can be interpreted as evidence of 
cause: effect. One key element of such a model is that the comparison 
between groups is a fair one. This fairness can be achieved in a 
number of ways. One is to randomly allocate all participating cases to 
the initial groups, in a randomised controlled trial (RCT). Another is to 
allocate cases to groups in terms of a threshold or cut-off point, in a 
regression discontinuity design (RDD). The technique of matching 
cases between the two groups, in terms of their known characteristics, 
can achieve superficial balance but is intrinsically more likely to lead 
to bias or imbalance than either RCT or RDD. Not matching cases and 
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simply having two (or more) naturally occurring groups is clearly even 
weaker. And weaker still is to have only one group and to compare 
before and after data. There is a hierarchy of designs for causal 
questions. No researcher can be blamed for not using a stronger 
design if it is genuinely not possible, and research does not become 
useless simply because it uses an inferior design. But an inferior 
design must then limit the kinds of claims made by the researcher, 
and the trustworthiness with which the findings are viewed by others.  
 
A real-life example might be a synthesis in which an intervention was 
tested in one piece of research using an RCT with 100 randomly-
allocated participants receiving the intervention and a further 100 
randomly-allocated participants not receiving it. In another piece of 
research the same intervention was tested with 200 cases. All were 
asked to volunteer and 100 did so. The results of the 100 volunteers 
were then compared with those of the other 100. It would be quite 
wrong to treat the evidence of the second study as anything like as 
important as that of the first (Gorard and See 2013). 
 
Scale 
A second consideration of trustworthiness would be scale. In general 
and all other things being equal, a larger study is more impressive 
than a smaller one. A study wishing to make a causal claim, but 
comparing two groups of 10 cases each, for example, would be trivial. 
It could also be seen as unethical – wasting the time of all concerned. 
In making a causal claim there are other factors to consider, as 
described below, but the comparison at the heart of the claim would 
usually need several hundred cases. A case is the unit that would be 
randomised or otherwise allocated to the two (or more) groups but not 
necessarily the unit from which data is collected. For example, if 60 
hospitals were randomly allocated to two groups, and then data was 
collected from all patients, the cases would be the hospitals not the 
patients. ‘N’ would be 60. 
 
A claim is commonly made that in some ways research in the social 
sciences is harder than in natural science because the cases are more 
variable and less inherently predictable (Nash 2004, Gorard 2004). 
This may be so, but it is seldom pursued to its logical conclusion. In 
order to make believable claims, social science research would 
therefore need a larger number of cases than used in other areas of 
investigation.  
 
  
Radical Statistics  2014 
51 
 
Attrition 
As important as scale is the completeness of the cases involved in the 
study. If the design has worked thus far, the research has two sizeable 
and very similar groups of cases ready for a comparison to take place 
after only one group has received the ‘treatment’ level of the purported 
cause. Any dropout from the study is serious after the cases have been 
allocated to comparison groups, because there is no reason to believe 
that the dropout will be either random or balanced (Hansen and 
Hurwitz 1946, Sheikh and Mattingly 1981). In social science, it can 
often be the knowledge of which group a case has been allocated to 
that creates the imbalance. For example, if the cases are people, 
knowing that being in the treatment group involves some effort might 
make cases in that group more likely to drop out. Or, if being in the 
treatment group is seen as exciting or beneficial there may be more 
attrition from the other group. Either way, those dropping out may be 
busier, more mobile, more likely to be homeless, less motivated, less 
literate, less concerned and so on. Despite lax WWC guidance to the 
contrary 
(http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/pdf/reference_resources/wwc_procedure
s_v3_0_draft_standards_handbook.pdf), bias can easily arise even if 
the amount of dropout is equal between the groups. Imagine a study 
looking at a remedial reading intervention for primary school children. 
The higher attaining children allocated to the treatment group might 
find the intervention programme patronising and unnecessary, 
making them more likely to drop out. The lower attaining children in 
the other group may be demoralised at not getting the extra help given 
to their peers in the treatment group. They may be less likely to 
continue to co-operate with the study. Even if the numbers dropping 
out are small and identical between the groups, the fact that the kinds 
of children dropping out in each group tend to differ will then create 
considerable bias for the results.  
 
For example, an RCT with 100 randomly-allocated participants 
receiving the intervention and a further 100 randomly-allocated 
participants not receiving it, and 100% completion rate has N=200. An 
RCT with 200 randomly-allocated participants receiving the 
intervention and a further 200 randomly-allocated participants not 
receiving it, but only a 75% completion rate has N=300. In any 
synthesis of evidence, the first study must be treated as far more 
trustworthy than the second despite the reported N being smaller. The 
missing 100 cases in the second study could completely transform the 
findings if their data was available. In fact this is a sensible approach 
to considering the possible impact of attrition – how different would 
Issue 110 Judging Research Trustworthiness  
52 
 
the data from the missing cases have to be to negate the apparent 
finding from the cases that are available?  
 
Quality of data 
Whatever the outcome of the intervention (or similar) is intended to be, 
the evidence presented for it needs to be of high quality. There are 
many factors to consider here. Where cases remain involved in the 
study but have missing data of any kind, this should be treated as 
part of attrition (above). A research report needs to clarify the N for 
each and every analysis, since N is rarely a constant in practice.  
 
The data on outcomes needs to be reliable in its true senses of being 
repeatable/replicable and of being judged to be the same by different 
observers (rather than merely internally consistent). In this respect, 
real-life measures such as length tend to be better than counts such 
as how many cases had a certain clear characteristic (Gorard 2010). 
Worse in turn are standardised tests of attainment which tend to be 
somewhat better than questionnaires used to estimate latent concepts 
such as motivation. Weakest of all will be impression data (although 
as with all forms of data collection this will have other advantages, but 
just not for trustworthiness – the subject of this paper). 
 
It is important that the outcome(s) of interest is specified and made 
clear before the study is conducted if at all possible. This is to prevent 
researchers or users subsequently dredging the results for success or 
failure. The outcome also needs to be independent of the intervention 
itself. A key threat, especially when the outcome measure is tied in 
any way to the intervention, is that the treatment group might practice 
the post-test or a close proxy for it. 
 
Further threats to safe findings 
There are a large number of further issues that could enhance or 
reduce the trustworthiness of research results. They are bundled 
together here because in practice (see below) the overall level of 
research quality is already set by this point. This is because the 
various elements of quality are related in practice to some extent. For 
example, it is unlikely that a design based on a very weak comparison 
group would bother with whether the participants were ‘blind’ as to 
which group they were in when the outcome data was collected. 
Similarly it would be rare for a large RCT not to have pre-specified 
outcomes.  
 
Perhaps the greatest amorphous threat to any study is a conflict of 
interest for anyone involved. Traditionally this has been interpreted as 
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concern where stakeholders stand to gain financially from the results 
of the study. However, COIs are wider than this. Researchers can have 
prestige or prior claims wrapped up in a study intended to test their 
own, perhaps well-known, theory. This might make them reluctant to 
face a robust and independent test of their claims. Practitioners can 
become unreasonably enthusiastic about an intervention even though 
ostensibly they have nothing to gain from an untrustworthy finding. 
The solution is, of course, that evaluators must be unconcerned about 
the nature of the results other than their quality, and that all 
interested parties should be ‘blinded’ as far as is feasible.  
 
Other threats to validity include having so many possible outcomes 
that some must be positive, the unintentional experimenter effect, 
accidental diffusion of treatment between allocated groups, post-
allocation demoralisation, and regression to the mean (Shaddish et al. 
2002).  
 
 
An aid to judging trustworthiness 
All of these ideas are summarised in Table 1, and associated with a 
simple star rating system. This can be used to help assess the 
trustworthiness of any relevant study. The ratings are from 4, the 
best kind of evidence that could be expected from a single large study, 
to 0, a study that adds little or nothing to the evidence base. A 
suggested procedure would be to start with the first column, reading 
down the design descriptions (for addressing a causal question) until 
the study is at least as good as the descriptor in that row. An RCT or 
RDD, for example, might lead to row 1. A propensity score matched 
design might lead to row 2. If the design is not reported or there is no 
comparator this would lead immediately to row 5. Staying in the row 
achieved for the design, move to the next column and read down the 
scale descriptions until the study is at least as good as the descriptor 
in that row. An RCT with only 12 cases in each group would end up in 
row 5 at this stage. Then repeat this process for each column, moving 
down (never up) the rows until the study is at least as good as the 
descriptor in that row. The final column in the table gives the 
estimated star rating for that study.  
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Table 1: A ‘sieve’ to assist in the estimation of trustworthiness 
 
Design Scale Dropout Outcomes Fidelity Validity Rating 
Fair design 
for 
comparison 
Large 
number of 
cases per 
comparison 
group 
Minimal 
attrition, 
no 
evidence of 
impact on 
findings 
Standardised 
pre-specified 
independent 
outcome  
Clear 
intervention, 
uniform 
delivery 
No evidence 
of diffusion 
or other 
threat 
4 
Balanced 
comparison 
Medium 
number of 
cases per 
comparison 
group 
Some initial 
imbalance 
or attrition 
Pre-specified 
outcome, not 
standardised or 
not independent  
Clear 
intervention, 
unintended 
variation in 
delivery 
Little 
evidence of 
diffusion or 
other threat 
3 
Matched 
comparison 
Small 
number of 
cases per 
comparison 
group 
Initial 
imbalance 
or 
moderate 
attrition 
Not pre-
specified but 
valid outcome  
Unclear 
intervention, 
with 
variation in 
delivery  
Evidence of 
experimente
r effect, 
diffusion or 
other threat 
2 
Comparison 
with poor 
or no 
equivalence 
Very small 
number of 
cases per 
comparison 
group 
Substantial 
imbalance 
and/or high 
attrition 
Outcome with 
issues of validity 
or 
appropriateness 
Poorly 
specified 
intervention 
Strong 
indication of 
experimente
r effect, 
diffusion or 
other threat 
1 
No report of 
comparator 
A trivial 
scale of 
study, or N 
unclear 
Attrition 
not 
reported or 
too high for 
any 
comparison 
Too many 
outcomes, weak 
measures, or 
poor reliability 
No clearly 
defined 
intervention 
No 
consideratio
n of threats 
to validity 
0 
 
This means that an evaluation will be judged to be as good as the 
lowest classification it has achieved for each of the six categories. For 
any column, if it is not possible to discern the quality of the study 
from the available report(s) then the rating must be placed in the 
lowest (0) category. In using this aid, the emphasis throughout is 
intended to be on judgement. The ratings represent how much one 
might be prepared to stake on an intervention working or not, based 
on a single evaluation, in the same context or setting again.  
 
The ratings should take no account of whether the intervention itself 
was deemed successful. That is part of the impact assessment. Nor 
should they take into account the practicalities, or otherwise, of the 
intervention. That is part of the cost : benefit analysis. A low rating 
should not be interpreted as necessarily the ‘fault’ of the researcher – 
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who will often be faced with practical, resource and ethical 
constraints. The researcher can however be deemed at fault in three 
common ways: 
 
 if the rating is low because the reporting of research is poor or 
incomplete, or cannot be understood by the audience for which it 
is intended 
 
 if there is clearly a better, simpler or more powerful approach the 
researcher could have used with the same resources 
 
 or if the researcher tries to make claims or draw conclusions 
unwarranted by their study. 
  
A few examples can help illustrate how the approach is used, although 
they are presented only in summary here. Two recent evaluations of 
literacy catch-up programmes for 11-year-olds are of contrasting 
quality.  
 
An evaluation of Switch-on Reading was based on 314 individually 
randomised Year 7 pupils who were struggling with literacy 
(http://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/projects/switch-on-
reading/). The pupils were taught individually in their own schools 
meaning that diffusion was just about impossible. They were pre-
tested before randomisation to one of two groups of 157 (i.e. blind), 
and re-tested on-line. The test was standard, independent of the 
intervention and agreed as a fair test by the programme developers. 
Six pupils (under 2%) dropped out for a number of valid reasons 
including leaving the country between pre and post-test. None had 
extreme scores. After the evaluation the control pupils also received 
the intervention. The design of the study was a fair one, the 
randomisation produced two reasonable sized and balanced groups, 
and the attrition was too low to have affected the substantive result. 
Using the sieve, this study would be 4 (or perhaps 3 if 150+ is not 
considered a ‘large’ number of cases in each group).  
 
An evaluation of Response to Intervention, used for the same reasons 
and with the same kind of pupils as Switch-on, involved 61 schools 
randomised to the intervention or not 
(http://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/projects/response-to-
intervention/). This is immediately a weaker study, despite also being 
an RCT, because however many pupils took part in each school the 
number of cases is really only 30 (schools) per comparison group. In 
practice, 12 schools dropped out or provided no post-test scores after 
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being randomised to groups. In total, attrition was near 25%, mostly 
from the control group. The study is therefore 1. It starts as a fair 
design, loses a step in Table 1 because of scale, and then loses further 
steps because of attrition. By that stage the other columns cease to 
matter very much. In fact, the quality of the rest of the study including 
the conduct of the intervention itself was considerably better than 1. 
Nevertheless, in any synthesis of evidence the evaluation of RTI must 
be weighted much lower than that for Switch-on irrespective of their 
reported results and effect sizes, and the fact that both were RCTs led 
by the same research team with roughly equivalent resources.  
 
A third recent evaluation was of an attempt by a partnership of 
schools to enhance the use of feedback by teaching staff 
(http://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/projects/anglican-
schools-partnership/). All nine primary schools in the partnership 
formed the intervention group. Comparisons were provided by a set of 
five neighbouring schools not in the partnership (compared in terms of 
data collected specifically for the evaluation), and all other state-
funded schools in the same local authority (compared in terms of 
official Key Stage 2 results, and of their published value-added scores). 
The study was conducted like this because it was a large pilot (around 
3,000 pupils), but it is, at best, a ‘matched comparison’ and so the 
study drops through the sieve to 2 in the first column. It then stays 
in that row, because in all other respects the study was at least as 
good as the descriptions of 2. For example, attrition was actually 
quite low given the scale.  
 
These three examples are simply illustrations. But they do show that 
the same kind of design can lead to more or less trustworthy results 
depending upon what happens in practice. They show that the 
trustworthiness of a study is not a function of its researchers, funders, 
institutions, or the outlet in which it is published. They also show that 
despite the so-called ‘gold standard’ of RCTs, other designs can turn 
out to be more trustworthy in practice.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The procedure here is intended to be as inclusive as possible. It is 
deliberately non-specific about the kind of data involved in any study 
since the latter is independent of issues like design, scale and data 
quality. An RCT can have any kind of outcome from standardised test 
to differences in impression. A trustworthy number of cases for any 
claim would be the same whether the data was collected face-to-face, 
via Skype, email, or survey for example. The procedure can be 
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extended to descriptive research, rather than the kinds of causal 
investigations discussed here, using mostly the same factors such as 
scale, attrition, or data quality. The same basic idea of the 
methodological warrant would apply to descriptive studies as much as 
causal ones (i.e. if the conclusion to be drawn were not in fact true 
how could we explain the apparent evidence for it?). But that will be 
the subject of a further paper.  
 
There is no technical or push-button solution that will decide whether 
to include a study in a synthesis of evidence or not, or how much 
weight to give it if it is included. Either decision is necessarily a 
judgement (Gorard 2006). This judgement should be justified and 
made clear to others so that they can decide if they agree, or where 
exactly it is that they disagree. It is perhaps here that the ‘sieve’ might 
be most useful. Unfortunately there is also a danger that it becomes a 
complex or extensive technical check-list 
(http://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/evaluation/). This is 
not the intention and not how it will be best used.  
 
The cell descriptions are also deliberately non-specific. This is not lack 
of care, but passing of control to the user. For example, the phrase ‘a 
large number of cases’ might be interpreted rather differently, 
depending upon the precise context, question or pay-off. There is also 
an interaction between the simple number of cases, their 
completeness, representativeness of a wider set of cases, and the 
integrity of the way they have been allocated to groups. ‘A large 
number of cases’ would certainly be in the hundreds, but there is no 
precise figure such as 400 that can be set, other than as a rough 
guide. An excellent study might have one case below whatever 
threshold is suggested (399) and a weak one might have one more 
(401). Similarly, a true RCT might be considered a ‘fair design for 
comparison’ but there will be other designs of equal ability to 
discriminate between effect and noise. Some may not even have been 
thought of yet. There is no limit to the ingenuity of research design. An 
attrition rate of 2% might be crucial if the missing cases all had 
extreme scores in the same direction, whereas 10% might still yield 
reasonably secure results if there was an obvious reason for the 
dropout that was unbiased across groups and types of cases. As with 
N, there is no clear threshold between ‘minimal’ attrition and worse 
that can be defended. It is like the hair: beard argument. There is a 
clear difference between trivial attrition and non-trivial attrition. But 
where precisely that difference lies is a matter of judgement, based on 
what is known about the precise context and the nature of the missing 
cases and where they appeared in the research process.  
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Part of what is achieved by the procedure described here is a way of 
retaining more evidence in an evidence synthesis while being careful 
and scrupulous about the quality of evidence. Ten studies of 
reasonable quality each involving 10 cases must be at least as 
important as one reasonable quality study of 100 cases. Yet many 
traditional approaches to evidence synthesis would reject each of the 
ten smaller studies on account of scale (examples from 
https://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/). Similar rejections often occur because 
of deficiencies of design or even because of the nature of data 
collection or analysis. These same syntheses may, rather strangely 
perhaps, also make great play about including all studies even those 
that are not published because of the bias caused by the file-drawer 
problem (Torgerson 2003). All readably reported studies should be 
considered in a synthesis, published or unpublished and despite 
deficiencies of scale and quality. All studies can help the aggregation 
towards the best possible bet on whether a finding is true or whether 
an approach works or not. At the same time, however, a synthesis 
cannot be a simple vote-count. The quality of each study needs to be 
taken into account explicitly, as well as it ‘effect’ size and costs. It is 
such judgements of quality that the sieve presented in this paper is 
intended to assist with.  
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